Examining the judicial authority to issue nationwide relief against federal policies
Trump v. CASA de Maryland centers on the judicial authority to issue nationwide injunctions against federal policies. While the underlying policy involved immigration regulations, the key legal question concerns whether federal courts have the constitutional and equitable authority to issue relief that extends beyond the specific parties to a case, effectively blocking federal policies across the entire United States.
Universal (or nationwide) injunctions permit a single federal court to enjoin the government from implementing a policy against anyone, not merely the plaintiffs in the case. This remedy raises fundamental questions about the appropriate scope of judicial power in a constitutional democracy.
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution states: "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority..." This provision establishes and simultaneously delimits federal judicial power.
Article III's "case or controversy" requirement fundamentally constrains judicial power by limiting courts to resolving specific disputes between particular parties. This limitation raises serious questions about the constitutional basis for universal injunctions:
The Supreme Court in Gill v. Whitford (2018) emphasized that "a plaintiff's remedy must be tailored to redress the plaintiff's particular injury." This principle challenges the constitutional foundation of relief that extends to non-parties.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 establishes the requirements for class action certification, providing a procedural mechanism to aggregate similar claims while ensuring due process protections. The relationship between class actions and universal injunctions raises important questions about procedural integrity:
Rule 23 Requirements for Class Certification:
Rule 23(b)(2) specifically addresses injunctive relief, permitting certification when "the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole."
Critics argue that universal injunctions circumvent these procedural protections, particularly:
The historical foundation for modern injunctive relief lies partly in equity practices that predated the Constitution. Bills of peace were equitable remedies that could occasionally bind non-parties, making them relevant to contemporary debates about universal injunctions:
Bills of Peace: These were equitable remedies that allowed courts to resolve multiple related disputes in a single proceeding when:
Equity Rule 48, a predecessor to modern class action rules, permitted representative suits where parties were too numerous to bring before the court. While these historical remedies did occasionally operate beyond immediate parties, their scope and application differed significantly from modern universal injunctions:
Post-Civil War cases involving injunctive relief for former slaves are sometimes cited as precedent for broad equitable relief, though scholars debate whether these cases truly support modern universal injunction practice.
The practical implementation of federal policies presents significant challenges when injunctions apply piecemeal across different jurisdictions. This raises concerns about administrative burden and the uniform application of federal law:
The Supreme Court has increasingly expressed concern about universal injunctions through its "shadow docket," where emergency applications for stays of nationwide injunctions have become more common. Justice Thomas's concurrence in Trump v. Hawaii specifically questioned whether "district courts have the authority to issue universal injunctions," suggesting the Court may eventually impose significant limitations on this practice.
Professor Bray's influential article argues that nationwide injunctions contravene traditional equity practice and exceed the constitutional powers of federal courts. He traces the historical development of injunctive relief and proposes limiting injunctions to protecting named plaintiffs.
Professor Sohoni examines historical cases where courts issued injunctions with effects extending beyond immediate parties, challenging the claim that universal injunctions lack historical precedent. She identifies instances from the early twentieth century where courts issued relief that functionally resembled modern universal injunctions.
This accessible analysis explains why nationwide injunctions pose constitutional concerns and practical problems for legal development, arguing they represent a significant departure from traditional judicial practice that undermines the separation of powers.
Professor Frost contends that nationwide injunctions serve important functions in the modern administrative state, preserving uniform application of federal law and preventing constitutional violations. She argues that limiting injunctions to named plaintiffs can create inequities and administrative confusion.
In this significant concurring opinion, Justice Thomas provides a detailed analysis of why he believes universal injunctions exceed Article III power and depart from historical practice. The opinion (beginning on page 49) signals the Supreme Court's growing skepticism toward this remedy.